FOR many years, a plausible case could be made that two forms of timidity, one Chinese and one American, were blocking the sort of strategy that might—just might—make North Korea suspend or abandon its sprint to a nuclear arsenal. Start with the Chinese.
In theory, the prospect of a nuclear-armed North Korea peninsula worried Communist leaders in Beijing every bit as much as it did the Americans. The problem was that in China’s hierarchy of horrors, a nuclear-armed Korean dictator ranked very high, but just below the prospect of regime collapse in North Korea. That surpassing Chinese horror of instability meant that, to simplify, China’s rulers were willing to agree to any level of sanctions on North Korea, except those horrible enough to stand a chance of success.
The Americans stand charged with their own form of timidity. Since George H.W. Bush, successive presidents have steeled themselves to negotiate with North Korea about its nuclear and missile programmes. America has offered massive bribes in return for...Continue reading
Source: United States http://ift.tt/2xulYTJ
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